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Douglas Laycockt
Constitutional Cultures contains many shrewd insights, and at least
one spectacular insight. Every lawyer interested in the Constitution should
read it. But read it only for specific insights, taken one at a time. The
theory by which Nagel tries to unify these insights is part of the problem,
not a step towards a solution.
Thus, the book's whole is very much less than the sum of its parts. The
insights are interspersed with polemic against judicial review in general
and liberal judges in particular, blaming judges for all our constitutional
ills and most constitutional change. The polemic is supported by a re-
markably selective marshalling of history and examples.
The book is difficult to summarize, in part because of its inductive
style, and in part because it finds so many different things wrong with
judicial review. The power of Nagel's argument is in his cumulation of
examples of judicial review being done in ways he does not like. But not
all of the examples seem consistent. Thus, he generally attacks the Court
for trying to do too much, but he sometimes attacks the Court for doing
too little.1 He offers only the most conclusory statement of what he thinks
the Court should do instead,2 and gives no hint of how the Court should
explain the results he would prefer. It is not clear whether he thinks that
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almost nothing is unconstitutional, or that almost nothing is justiciable.
He seems to think both.
The book consists mostly of material published earlier in article form,
with very little apparent revision; only chapter 1 is new. The unifying
theme is that each chapter is about some problem that Nagel attributes to
the judicial "mentality." This is a broad umbrella, and it shelters what
seem to me to be two distinct parts. Nagel argues that courts reach bad
results in constitutional cases (chapters 1-4) and that they write bad opin-
ions (chapters 5-7), and that each of these defects is inherent in the judi-
cial process.
With respect to results, Nagel argues that the adversarial process and
the training of lawyers are inherent sources of doctrinal instability.3 Law-
yers are trained to invent new arguments and to distinguish old prece-
dents. They are committed to rational argument, and thus are hostile to
traditional values rooted more in human experience than in logic. 4 For
both of these reasons, judges are the last people who should be entrusted
with preservation of fundamental values: "[T]he special function of the
judiciary is to change constitutional meaning." 5 Nagel concludes that the
Constitution fares much better when judges do not enforce it.'
Consequently, judges should assume a much smaller constitutional role.
They should hold governmental actions unconstitutional only when those
actions are "emphatically inconsistent with constitutional theory, text, and
public understanding as expressed in prolonged practice."'7 Nagel espe-
cially hates "the routinization of judicial power" and the "judiciary's fre-
quent intervention in ordinary political affairs."" He apparently would
have the Court issue an occasional pronouncement, in an especially egre-
gious case, reminding the states and the other two branches that they
should respect constitutional rights.9 Then the judiciary should withdraw,
leaving implementation of the Constitution to other units of government.
Nagel would reduce all of judicial review to what Philip Bobbitt calls the
"expressive function.""0
Nagel is more effective when he criticizes judicial opinions. He shows,
with detailed illustrations, that Supreme Court opinions tend to be de-
tached from the facts of cases."1 The opinions focus on what is rational







9. Pp. 46, 61, 81-82.
10. See P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 196-219 (1982) (describing some decisions as per-




plicit discussion of the real competing interests at stake.'2 Their analysis
of rationality and of means and ends is often artificial and distorted, some-
times even dishonest. Every constitutional inquiry is soon reduced to a
multi-part test, which largely substitutes for the constitutional text. This
observation leads to the title of chapter 7, The Formulaic Constitution,
and forms the basis of the insight I consider spectacular. The Justices of
the Supreme Court, and their law clerks, should be required to read and
meditate on this chapter at frequent intervals-say the first Monday of
every month.
This review will range as widely as Nagel's book, exploring fundamen-
tal issues of constitutional method as well as the details of Nagel's argu-
ment. The review has three independent parts. First, I respond to Nagel's
substantive attack on judicial review. I concede many of his examples and
criticisms, but dispute others, and highlight examples that he ignores. I
argue that Nagel misunderstands the role of judges, misunderstands the
justifications for judicial review, and misunderstands the Constitution.
Second, I argue that the vast expansion of Federal power since the
founding is firmly rooted in constitutional text, and that it is not the prod-
uct of usurpation or judicial manipulation. This is a special case of my
response to Nagel's substantive attack on judicial review.
Finally, I endorse much of Nagel's criticism of judicial opinions, but I
argue that the style of argument in Supreme Court opinions is largely a
response to Nagel's own brand of criticism of the Court. For decades,
people like Nagel have been telling judges that they are not supposed to
decide questions of substance, that they are not supposed to balance com-
peting interests and that they are not supposed to do anything important.
Many judges have internalized these views. In so doing, they ignore the
structure of constitutional rights, which requires them to do exactly what
Nagel would forbid.
The Justices are charged with enforcing a Constitution that expressly
creates sweeping substantive rights. The government constantly demands
implied exceptions to these rights. Thus, the analytic structure of constitu-
tional rights forces the Court to decide important questions of substance,
balancing the need for implied exceptions against the literal demands of
the Constitution. The Court should have explicitly acknowledged the ne-
cessity of tackling substantive issues, and challenged its critics head on,
but it has not. Instead, it takes refuge in the artificial analyses that Nagel
decries, concealing substantive issues in clouds of technical rhetoric and
multi-tiered tests. Nagel is hardly entitled to complain.
12. P. 105.
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I. THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In the first four chapters, Nagel develops the substantive argument that
judicial review cannot work. Most of the general argument appears in
chapter 2; chapters 3 and 4 attempt to illustrate it in the areas of free
speech and federalism. Chapter 1 is a short apologia, conceding that
Brown v. Board of Education1 3 was a good thing even though Nagel can-
not justify it. He claims only that Brown was more nearly justifiable than
most of what the Court does,14 but that one spectacular success cannot
justify an institution that generally does more harm than good. Even the
whims of a tyrant will occasionally produce a good result. 15 That does not
justify tyranny, any more than Brown alone justifies judicial review.
A. The General Argument
Nagel's attack on judicial review combines familiar arguments with real
insights. The Supreme Court's actual track record is mixed. Successes like
Brown are balanced by disasters like Dred Scott; 6 even the success of
Brown was dissipated in the miasma of busing." For long periods the
Court has been hostile to civil liberties instead of protective."8 Major doc-
trines are adopted, abandoned, and even reversed; the courts have not pro-
vided doctrinal stability. 19 Ultimately, Nagel concludes that the legal sys-
tem cannot provide stability, because the adversary system encourages the
continuous search for novel arguments.2"
Judicial decisions sometimes focus issues and sharpen controversies that
might otherwise be left vague and neglected. Politicians and elected offi-
cials can finesse controversies with fuzzy language, by avoiding statements
of principle, by agreeing on the result without agreeing on reasons, or by
not offering reasons at all. Politicians can also engage in occasional emer-
gency suppression without publishing records, without stating formal jus-
tifications, and without treating their .actions as precedent.2 ' Judges have
much more difficulty using these techniques. Courts must give reasons,
articulate general principles, and live with their precedents.22 A series of
cases will pressure courts to draw precise lines-to say that this plaintiff
wins and that a similar but not quite identical plaintiff loses. Judicial
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. P. 5.
15. P. 4.
16. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
17. Pp. 4, 24.
18. Pp. 27, 54-56.
19. Pp. 9-11.
20. Pp. 7-9.
21. P. 40; ef. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("A
military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we
review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution.").
22. Pp. 17-22.
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emphasis on principle tends to push arguments to their limit instead of
toward acceptable compromise."
Nagel also scores a point when he notes that most constitutional theo-
rists tend to de-emphasize the actual record of judicial review and instead
defend it in principle. Theorists focus on the intellectual issues, and they
are "captured by the lure of the possible." '24 To elaborate on Nagel's
point, each theorist believes the Court would do much better if it would
just adopt the right constitutional theory and consistently apply it. Each
theorist believes that if he had five votes on the Court, he would decide
cases consistently and coherently. He would be right in principle and
would focus on the right issues, though of course there would be close
cases, and he would make mistakes at the margin. Many theorists are
even right in these high opinions of their own theory. If coherence and
stability are the criteria, almost any consistently applied theory could do
better than the Court has done.
The essential fact is that no one person does have five votes on the
Court, and no one person has even a single vote permanently. This
reduces the risks of tyranny and of idiosyncratic decisions, but it substi-
tutes other insoluble problems. The Justices come to the Court with very
different views of the Constitution; they must combine these views into
group decisions. Inconsistency and instability are inherent in group deci-
sion-making. The reasons have been formally explained by Kenneth Ar-
row and others,2 5 and Judge Easterbrook has applied this analysis to the
work of the Supreme Court.28 The reasons are captured informally in the
folk saying that a camel is a horse designed by a committee. Constitutional
doctrine is the Supreme Court's camel, and from every point on the politi-
cal spectrum, critics find it lumpy and ungainly. On this point, all the
critics are right, and the situation will not improve.
But Nagel does not mention the problems inherent in group decision-
making. These problems are equally applicable to the political branches,
so they do not serve his end of showing that courts are uniquely ill-suited
to decide anything important.
Nagel turns instead to selective constitutional history to support his
claim that the Court's work has been generally harmful. He claims that
the constitutional provisions that have worked well are those the Court
has not interpreted. He offers such examples as the republican form
clause, the advice and consent clause, the provisions for elections and
terms of office, and the qualifications for office. He claims that constitu-
23. Pp. 20, 38-40.
24. P. 4; set, also pp. 31-34 (reviewing two generations of scholars who severely criticized judge-
made law of free speech while at same time looking to judges for solution).
25. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). For surveys of the
literature, see D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979); Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
26. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).
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tional meaning that emerges from practice is stable and widely accepted;2 7
constitutional meaning that is announced by courts is unstable and contro-
versial. He carefully anticipates and refutes several arguments that the
uninterpreted clauses are different in kind from the interpreted clauses.28
Unfortunately, he ignores other obvious objections. In part, he inverts
cause and effect. It is not that some clauses have had stable and uncon-
troversial meanings because they were never litigated. Rather, some
clauses had stable and uncontroversial meanings, and, because they had
such meanings, those clauses were never litigated. The engine of constitu-
tional change is not judges, but controversy. Judges sometimes aggravate
controversy, but they hardly ever start it.
Other rarely litigated clauses produced controversies that the Court re-
fused to decide, with disparate results. Sometimes the Court's refusal to
enforce a clause kills the clause, in the sense that participants in public
disputes quit appealing to it. Most obviously, this is what happened to the
privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
But sometimes, the Court's refusal to enforce a clause simply moves the
dispute to other forums, with no reduction in controversy and no increase
in stability. Thus, disputes over constitutional amendments are nonjusti-
ciable,3" but bitter controversy continues over many aspects of the amend-
ment process: repeated ratification votes, rescission of ratifications, time
limits for ratification, extension of time limits, when Congress must call a
convention, whether a convention can be limited to a single subject, and so
on. 1 The Court's refusal to adjudicate anything about the amendment
process has even facilitated arguments that the Article V amendment pro-
cess is not exclusive.3 2
The republican form clause has experienced both phenomena: dormant
and ignored in normal times, but a wholly unpredictable source of contro-
versial power in extraordinary times. The republican form clause supplied
much of the constitutional theory for congressional reconstruction of state
government in the defeated South."
27. Pp. 12-14.
28. Pp. 14-17.
29. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7-4 (1988).
30. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
31. For debate on these issues, see R. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING
THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION (1988); Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitu-
tional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1983); Rees, Throwing
Away the Key: The Unconstitutionality of the Equal Rights Amendment Extension, 58 TEx. L. REV.
875 (1980); Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97
HARV. L. REV. 433 (1983).
32. See Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 491-98
(1989); Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1043 (1988).
33. See E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-77, at 232,
272 (1988). For an account of the Southern theory of the clause, see Vile, John C. Calhoun on the
Guarantee Clause, 40 S.C.L. REV. 667, 676-82 (1989).
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Three distinct claims are embedded in Nagel's comparison of constitu-
tional law made by courts and constitutional law made without courts. He
claims that when courts stay out of an issue, the resulting constitutional
law is i) stable and ii) satisfactory. He also claims iii) that when courts do
undertake to enforce a clause, and doctrine changes, the courts are the
cause of the change. He ignores powerful counter-examples on all three
points, and, his third point overlooks the whole political process.
With respect to the claim of stability, consider relations between the
President and the Congress. The Court has largely left that relationship
to the political process, intervening only sporadically. Yet, as Nagel
frankly acknowledges, 4 there have been large fluctuations in the relative
constitutional power of the other two branches, 5 resulting in both con-
gressional government and imperial presidencies. For example, Woodrow
Wilson wrote his famous book describing how checks and balances had
given way to congressional supremacy, 6 but in a new preface only fifteen
years later, he wrote that power had shifted dramatically to the execu-
tive. 37 Likewise, Supreme Court decisions did not cause the difference be-
tween Andrew Johnson's power in 1866 and Lyndon Johnson's in 1966.
Practice on important matters has developed, changed, and changed
back again. The long-term struggle for control of foreign affairs has
barely been influenced, and certainly not abated, by judicial deference.
Power shifts of constitutional significance have been accomplished by stat-
utes, such as the Budget Act3" and the War Powers Resolution,39 as well
as by accumulating practice, such as executive agreements40 and adminis-
trative agencies.41
The history of the constitutional rights of blacks is even more telling:
Judicial deference produced results that were neither stable nor satisfac-
tory. Except for a handful of narrow Supreme Court decisions, the rights
of blacks were largely left to the political process from about 1860 to
about 1950.42 By Nagel's theory, the constitutional provisions guarantee-
34. P. 22.
35. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 289 (1980); A.
SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDEN-
TIAL POWER 12-20 (1988).
36. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1st ed. 1885).
37. Id. at xi-xiii (15th ed. 1900).
38. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat.
297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1, 2 & 31 U.S.C.).
39. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988)).
40. See J. CHOPER, supra note 35, at 356-57; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 35, at 85-88,
105-09, 311-16.
41. For analyses of the constitutional role of agencies, see Bruff, Presidential Power and Admin-
itrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 (1979); Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984). Ira Lupu adds to this
example the recent reassertion of presidential control over agencies. Lupu, When Cultures Collide
(Book Review), 103 HARV. L. REV. 951, 955 (1990).
42. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (requiring state to provide
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ing the rights of blacks should have been a great success in that period.
We should have had stable constitutional meaning with little controversy,
and basic constitutional rights should have been broadly respected.
In fact, the results were neither stable nor satisfactory. There was dra-
matic growth in constitutional doctrine during the Civil War and Recon-
struction-all coming from the political branches and eventually written
into the Constitution by coerced ratification of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments. 3 The war was followed by eleven years of vigorous but gradually
declining congressional commitment to the constitutional rights of blacks."
Then, in 1876, the Federal Government abandoned blacks to their fate:
the political branches dramatically reversed their constitutional policy.
There ensued seventy-five years of relative stability, massive oppression,
and wholesale constitutional violations. The Supreme Court kept its hands
off, narrowly interpreting the privileges or immunities clause, 45 the equal
protection clause,46 and the Civil Rights Act, 7 so that it had nothing left
to enforce. But judicial abdication did not produce the satisfactory results
that Nagel's theory predicts.
Similarly, the courts stayed out of legislative apportionment until the
1960's.4 Despite unambiguous mandates in many state constitutions for
periodic apportionment on the basis of population, most state legislatures
were grossly malapportioned. 49 Small minorities of the population con-
trolled a majority of legislative seats in perpetuity, with no prospect that
they would ever relinquish that control voluntarily. The situation had
persisted for decades, and had gotten steadily worse. Doctrine was stable,
but one can hardly claim that results were satisfactory.
Nagel's most serious error is the claim I have numbered (iii), attribut-
ing constitutional change to the judiciary. In fact, such changes
often-and major changes always-originate off the Court. Great lonL'-
term changes in constitutional doctrine result from great long-term shits
in political balance.
Consider constitutional history since the New Deal. The New Deal
law school for blacks); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (invalidating zoning law forbidding
blacks to live in white neighborhoods); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating
literacy test for voting with grandfather clause for whites); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879) (reversing criminal conviction of black tried before jury from which blacks had been excluded).
43. For a brief description of the ratification process, see Ackerman, supra note 32, at 500-07.
44. The best study of this period is E. FONER, supra note 33.
45. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
46. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
47. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
48. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (invalidating malapportionment of congres-
sional districts) and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (apportionment questions are justiciable)
with Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (apportionment questions are nonjusticiable).
49. For summary data on each state as of 1963-64, see R. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE
LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 46-47 (1965). For the specific constitutional re-
quirements in each of these states, disregarding general provisions such as equal protection clauses, see
id. at 460-75.
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brought massive shifts in constitutional doctrine, shifts that expanded Fed-
eral power, largely ended judicial review of economic regulation, and be-
gan a new era of protection for civil liberties. Nagel offers the expansion
of Federal power as one of the most fundamental constitutional changes.5°
Bruce Ackerman describes the New Deal changes as a constitutional
transformation, a massive but implicit constitutional amendment, ratified
in the election of 1936. 1' No one denies that these changes were large and
important. But for Nagel to attribute them to judges is nonsense. These
changes were initiated by the political branches and pushed through de-
spite vigorous resistance by the Supreme Court.
Eventually the Court acquiesced in the new constitutional theory, and
after the newly dominant political coalition appointed a majority of the
justices, the Supreme Court began to take its own initiatives in line with
the new theory. There followed half a century of right-wing criticism of
the Supreme Court. Appointments to the Court have been a significant
issue in most recent presidential elections, beginning with Richard
Nixon's promise to make judicial appointments that would "strengthen
the peace forces." (He meant the police, not the war protesters.) This long
conservative campaign may at last have created, beginning with October
Term 1988, a reliable new Supreme Court majority on a wide range of
issues. Given the age distribution of the current Justices, the Republican
ascendancy in presidential elections, and the Court's significance to an im-
portant part of the Republican coalition, this new majority may persist for
the foreseeable future. If so, we may see major changes in constitutional
doctrine.
Nagel's claim that judicial abdication yields doctrinal stability implies
that without judicial review, such changes would not occur at all. But this
is utter nonsense. Such a claim ignores the fifty-year political campaign to
change the Court's membership, just as Nagel's account of doctrinal
change in the New Deal ignores the long campaigns of the Progressives
and Realists to alter the Court's membership. Nagel ignores how Justices
get to be Justices. The political process sketches the broad outlines of ma-
jor doctrinal changes; newly appointed Justices merely work out the
details.
In fact, the Justices are a force for stability in such changes. Life-
tenured holdovers from earlier administrations resist change and slow it
down. Without judicial review, Roosevelt's view of the Constitution, or
Nixon's, or Reagan's, would have been implemented much more quickly.
Newly appointed Justices sometimes turn on those who appointed them.
Even Justices who implement the changes they were appointed to imple-
ment may moderate the pace or magnitude of change. It took twenty years
50. P. 11.
51. Ackerman, supra note 32, at 510-15.
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of Republican appointments to the Court to produce the apparent new
majority. We can argue whether this drag on the political branches is
good or bad. But it refutes Nagel's claim that judges are the engine of
change and not a source of doctrinal stability.
B. Judicial Review and a General System of Free Speech
Nagel's chapter on free speech applies and extends his general argu-
ment. He considers free speech not as an individual right, but only as a
structural guarantee of democratic rule. He argues that judicial protection
of free speech in individual cases is not necessary to maintain a general
system of free speech, and may even be harmful. Judicial protection is not
necessary because the political branches have always ended our worst pe-
riods of suppression-the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Red Scare after
World War I, McCarthyism, wartime censorship-without much help
from the judiciary.52 Judicial protection may be harmful, because frequent
judicial protection of the least attractive forms of speech may discredit the
idea of free speech in the public mind.53
Again, he disregards counterexamples. He says that the Supreme Court
did not protect those who protested the War in Vietnam until 1968, when
the war was already unpopular.5 He is just wrong about the dates; the
first decision protecting protest against the war came in 1966, 5  and the
decisions protecting draft resisters began in 1965.6 More important, the
Vietnam protesters operated under shelter of the Court's decisions protect-
ing civil rights protesters,5" and under earlier decisions protecting political
extremists, 58 religious proselytizers5 9 and labor organizers.6 0 These deci-
sions made it unnecessary to decide a Vietnam protest case as such.
52. Pp. 36-37.
53. P. 39.
54. P. 57 & n.164.
55. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (holding that Georgia legislature could not refuse to
seat member who opposed war and draft).
56. See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968) (authorizing pre-
induction judicial review where local draft board denied exemption as punishment for protesting
draft); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (effectively reading theism requirement out of
exemption for conscientious objectors). My colleague Michael Tigar, who litigated many Vietnam-era
draft cases and was Editor-in-Chief of the Selective Ser'ice Law Reporter, agrees that 1969 was a
turning point in the Supreme Court's willingness to scrutinize selective service decisions. But he at-
tributes this change to judicial loss of confidence in local draft boards, and he believes it began some-
what earlier in the lower courts. Judges lost confidence when they began to encounter cases in suffi-
cient numbers to become familiar with the actual administration of the selective service law. Cases did
not begin to arise in large numbers until the war became unpopular. Thus, his explanation coincides
chronologically with Nagel's. To distinguish the two explanations, Tigar relies on trial court decisions
that were unpopular in their local communities, such as the acquittal of Cesar Chavez' son by a
conservative district judge in Fresno, California. Conversation with Professor Michael Tigar (Nov.
15, 1989). For further evidence supporting his loss of confidence thesis, see Oestereich: "We deal with
conduct of a local Board that is basically lawless." 393 U.S. at 237.
57. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Ed-
wards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
58. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.
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The right of political protest-the marches, rallies, vigils, sit-ins, Free-
dom Rides, and all the rest-was as critical to the civil rights movement
as the desegregation decisions were.6 1 Perhaps Nagel would say that civil
rights protests would have succeeded even without judicial protection. Per-
haps so; there were heroes and heroines in those days, willing to brave
jail, chain gangs, police dogs, fire hoses, and even death for their cause.
Maybe they would have persisted to victory even if the courts had denied
them all constitutional protection and sided with the police dogs. Maybe
they did not need all the lawyers they struggled to pay, or the Justice
Department lawyers who supported them, or the Federal judges who de-
fied ostracism and death threats.6" More likely, the protestors would have
been worn down and defeated without judicial support. Certainly their
organizations would have been bankrupted. 3
There is no way to know whether the civil rights movement would have
succeeded without judicial support. What is clear is that the movement
thought it needed judicial support. The movement appears to have de-
pended in substantial part on the kind of judicial activity Nagel most de-
spises: on the repeated daily enforcement of constitutional principles in
case after case, getting people out of jail, saving assets from seizure, pro-
tecting the right to raise funds and thus to keep the struggle going. I do
not know what Nagel might have said about these cases. He ignores the
civil rights protests and the decisions that protected them.
A partial exception is his casual treatment of New York Times v. Sulli-
van. 6  He twice offers the case as a bad example.6 " His sarcastic initial
description of the case implies that it is a usurpation: "For most of our
history, reasonably vigorous public debate somehow coexisted with tradi-
tional defamation rules, but in 1964 it was discovered that the first
amendment required significant alterations in these rules in order to foster
vigorous public debate."66
147 (1939).
59. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
60. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307
U.S, 496 (1939).
61. This paragraph reflects on the history of the movement as told in T. BRANCH, PARTING THE
WVATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 (1988), and in Kennedy, Martin Luther King's
C, nsttutim: A Legal Hstory of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989). For an
additional account, see H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).
02. On the Federal judges, see J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981); J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT
LONELY MEN (1961). For an account of the death threats (and one attempt), see J. BASS, supra, at
79.
63. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (reversing $1.25 million judg-
ment against NAACP); Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979) (enjoining enforce-
ment of state court judgment against NAACP), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
64. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
65. Pp. 10, 37.
66. P. 10.
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The Court discovered this in 1964 because Alabama officials discovered
in 1960 that traditional defamation rules could be used to destroy a politi-
cal movement. When Sullivan was decided, there were $5.6 million worth
of defamation claims pending in Alabama against the New York Times,
and $1.7 million against CBS."7 Recall that these claims were in 1964
dollars. In the first two cases to go to trial, juries had awarded the full
amount claimed. 8 Many of these suits also named as defendants individ-
ual leaders of the civil rights movement. Seizure of the property of indi-
vidual defendants so discouraged or intimidated some leaders of the South-
ern Christian Leadership Conference that they left Alabama and accepted
jobs in the North. 9 The devastating threat of the defamation judgments is
a running theme in the history of the SCLC,7 ° but Nagel sees no First
Amendment problem.
He is similarly insensitive about the patronage cases,7 1 which he also
seems to see as usurpations with no real relationship to free speech and
democratic rule.7 ' Nagel did not live in Chicago under the Daley ma-
chine. I am confident that he has never worked a precinct by himself
while half a dozen employees of the city and of city contractors were paid
with public funds to work it for the other side. He has not experienced the
hopelessness of contesting elections in such a regime.
Judicial restrictions on patronage brought democracy to Chicago, re-
placing a one-party system in which all conflicts were resolved by secret
deliberations among the ward committeepersons who ran the party. (In
Chicago they were called committeemen, and in my time there, they were
always men.) Plaintiffs73 and defendants74 agree that the patronage case
broke up the machine and made it possible to hold competitive elections in
Chicago. Once again, this impact depended on the kind of continued judi-
cial activity that Nagel most despises. Patronage litigation in Chicago was
67. 376 U.S. at 295 (Black, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 294.
69. See T. BRANCH, supra note 61, at 580.
70. See id. at 289, 295-96, 312, 370-71, 382, 391, 515, 579-82, 590, 694.
71. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Shakman v.
Democratic Org., 533 F.2d 344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); Illinois State Em-
ployee's Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972); Shakman v. Democratic Org., 435 F.2d 267
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971). I should disclose that many years ago, I played a
very minor role in the Shakinan litigation as a student associate at a Chicago law firm that repre-
sented plaintiffs.
72. Pp. 10, 37. For the contrary view that the patronage cases should be understood as concerned
only with democratic rule, see Comment, Patronage and the First Amendment: A Structural Ap-
proach, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1369 (1989).
73. See Johnson, Successful Reform Litigation: The Shakman Patronage Case, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 479, 481-83, 486-88, 493-94 (1988).
74. See Keane, Torn Keane on Life After Daley, CHICAGO LAWYER, Apr. 1982, at 3. Keane,
perhaps the second most powerful figure in the machine under the first Mayor Daley, wrote that the
machine "is dying," and "the thing that is killing it is the Shakmnan decree." Id. at 4. "As long as it is
enforced by federal courts, no one is ever again going to put together a powerful political organization
in Chicago." Id. He notes that the organization began to lose down ballot races after the decree and
before the death of Mayor Daley. Id. at 3.
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not a one-time pronouncement of constitutional values, nor a series of in-
dividual suits by discharged workers. With Shakman v. Democratic Or-
ganization, voters and candidates obtained a highly publicized structural
injunction regulating public employment in Chicago. A public employee
penalized for neglecting his precinct work did not have to know that he
might have a claim, find a lawyer who would take his case on a contin-
gent fee, and file an independent lawsuit that would take months or years
to come to trial. Rather, such an employee could go to the Shakman law-
yers and file a contempt citation that would be set for hearing in days or
weeks. The same point is illustrated by the later opinion holding pa-
tronage hiring unconstitutional. 75 This opinion had little impact until it
was enforced with a detailed implementation decree.
76
The first decade of democracy in Chicago has been messy. One-party
states may be more efficient than democracies, especially for those on the
inside of the party organization. The change from patronage to civil ser-
vice may create a bureaucracy that is unresponsive to elected officials.
77
We could debate whether that is worse than elected officials unresponsive
to the voters, or whether courts should choose between these evils. But
Nagel ignores reality when he asserts that patronage had nothing to do
with a system of free speech and democratic government.
Nagel's failure to understand the patronage cases relates to his argu-
ment about the relative propensities of judges and politicians to protect
free speech. He says that judges in their highly controlled courtrooms have
no experience that would enable them to understand the value of free
speech, while politicians engage in free speech every day. 8 He follows up
by noting the disgraceful frequency with which judges try to suppress
speakers whose public criticism hinders judicial functions.79
Once again he misses the central point. In all of his examples, a judge
is suppressing speech that interferes with that judge's goals. Politicians
have a similar tendency to suppress speech that interferes with their goals.
Their most important goal is their own re-election. Thus, the great politi-
cal temptation to censorship is protection of incumbents and their policies.
Regulation of campaign finance always tends in that direction, and many
of the Supreme Court's famous free speech cases-most obviously the pro-
test cases and the national security cases-involved speech that was
thought to hinder government policy. Perhaps the classic example of sys-
temic incumbent protection is Huey Long's discriminatory tax on opposi-
75. Shakman v. Democratic Org., 481 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. I11. 1979), vacated in part sub nora.
Shakman v. Dunne, 829 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1026 (1988).
76. Shakman v. Democratic Org., 569 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. I1. 1983); see Freedman, Doing Battle
with the Patronage Army: Politics, Courts, and Personnel Administration in Chicago, 48 PUB.
ADMIN. REv. 847, 850 (1988).
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tion newspapers, struck down by a unanimous Court8 -one more exam-
ple that Nagel neglects to mention. Judicial enforcement of free speech
rights can be a check on incumbent protection, even if we need a different
check on judges' own tendency to self-protection.
C. Individual Rights
One other striking aspect of Nagel's argument is his indifference to in-
dividual rights. He appears to assume, without saying so explicitly, that
the majority is entitled to get its way, and that the resulting costs to indi-
viduals are no concern of constitutional law.
He complains in Chapter 4 that courts and commentators are too con-
cerned about individual rights and not concerned enough about constitu-
tional structure. But the principal point of this chapter is that federalism
and separation of powers are underprotected. This alone does not necessa-
rily imply that individual rights deserve little or no protection.
The clearest example of his attitude toward individual rights is in
Chapter 3, on free speech. He considers free speech law exclusively in
terms of preserving a general system of free speech. He ignores the harm
to individual victims of censorship and retaliation, except to note in pass-
ing-at the very end of the chapter-that protecting individual victims
might be a different rationale for free speech law."1 It is not a rationale he
investigates. He thinks he has written an evaluation of judicial review in
free speech cases without considering the interests of individual speakers.
Nagel also makes an original intent argument against the importance of
individual rights. He is surely right that our generation relies more than
the founders did on express individual rights and judicial review, and less
on separation of powers and federalism. But the difference lies in empha-
sis and degree. Nagel claims a much sharper difference, and to prove his
point, he relies on mischaracterization and misquotation.
He argues that the framers saw federalism and separation of powers as
"the great protection of the individual, not the 'parchment barriers' that
were later (and with modest expectations) added to the document." 2 The
accompanying footnote claims that "[wihen Madison proposed the Bill of
Rights to Congress, its importance for preserving freedom was not empha-
sized."8 3 These claims are simply false.
The phrase "parchment barriers" appears in The Federalist No. 48,
but it does not refer to the Bill of Rights. Instead, it refers to separation
80. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). For an account of the political signifi-
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[Vol. 99: 17111724
1990] Judicial Review 1725
of powers provisions of the form then found in many state constitutions.8 "
These were merely "parchment barriers"' 5 because they lacked indepen-
dent enforcement mechanisms. These provisions announced limits to legis-
lative power, but they did not give the other branches power to enforce
these limits. Consequently, the legislatures regularly exceeded their lim-
its.8" The solution was to provide for perpetual enforcement-to give "to
those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others." ' The defect
of "parchment barriers" was precisely the defect of Nagel's proposal for
constitutional rights without judicial enforcement.
A similar phrase, "paper barriers," appears in Madison's great speech
of June 8, 1789, introducing the Bill of Rights to the First Congress. 8
Once again, Madison was setting up the argument to refute it. He con-
ceded that some state bills of rights had been violated, 9 but he said that a
Federal Bill of Rights would be enforced by an independent judiciary." It
84. "Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments in the
constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit
of power?" THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
85. Id.
86.
This is the security which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most
of the American constitutions. But experience assures us that the efficacy of the provision has
been greatly overrated; and that some more adequate defense is indispensably necessary for the
more feeble against the more powerful members of the government. The legislative department
is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex.
Id. at 308-09.
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). The Federalist No.
48 analyzes the problem to which the more famous No. 51 proposes the solution. The intervening
papers, Nos. 49 and 50, consider and reject two other proposed solutions.
88.
It may be thought that all paper barriers against the power of the community are too weak to
be worthy of attention. I am sensible they are not so strong as to satisfy gentlemen of every
description who have seen and examined thoroughly the texture of such a defence; yet, as they
have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to establish the public opinion in
their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community, it may be one means to control
the majority from those acts to which they might be otherwise inclined.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (j. Gales ed. 1834) (remarks of James Madison) (June 8, 1789). Pagina-
tion is different in other printings of the Annals.
89.
It has been said, that it is unnecessary to load the constitution with this provision, because it
was not found effectual in the constitution of the particular States. It is true, there are a (sic)
few particular States in which some of the most valuable articles have not, at one time or
other, been violated; but it does not follow but they may have, to a certain degree, a salutary
effect against the abuse of power.
Id. at 456-57.
90.
If they [the rights in the Bill of Rights] are incorporated into the constitution, independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights;
they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or
executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipu-
lated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.
Id. at 457.
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was judicial review that would turn "paper barriers" into "an impenetra-
ble bulwark." '91
I have already said enough to show that Nagel flatly mischaracterizes
Madison. But the mischaracterization goes much further. Indeed, the
whole modern theory of judicial review in individual liberty cases is en-
capsulated in Madison's June 8 speech. The need for a Bill of Rights
even in a government of limited powers,92 the risk that a majority of the
community would oppress a minority," the importance of judicial re-
view,94 and the need to protect unenumerated rights95-it's all there in ten
pages of the Annals of Congress." Like many other judicial conservatives,
Nagel appeals simultaneously to the virtues of original intent and popular
democracy. But he cannot have it both ways, because the original intent
91. Id.
92. "[I]f all power is subject to abuse, . . . then it is possible the abuse of the powers of the
General Government may be guarded against in a more secure manner than is now done . Id.
at 449-50.
It is true, the powers of the General Government are circumscribed, they are directed to par-
ticular objects; but even if Government keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary
powers with respect to the means ... [For example,] the General Government has a right to
pass all laws which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collec-
tion are within the direction of the Legislature: may not general warrants be considered neces-
sary for this purpose, as well as for some purposes which it was supposed at the framing of
their constitutions the State Governments had in view? If there was reason for restraining the




[State bills of rights are directed] sometimes against the abuse of the executive power, some-
times against the legislative, and, in some cases, against the community itself; or, in other
words, against the majority in favor of the minority.
In our Government it is, perhaps, less necessary to guard against the abuse in the executive
department than any other; because it is not the stronger branch of the system, but the weaker:
It therefore must be levelled against the legislative, for it is the most powerful, and most likely
to be abused, because it is under the least control. Hence, so far as a declaration of rights can
tend to prevent the exercise of undue power, it cannot be doubted but such declaration is
proper. But I confess that I do conceive, that in a Government modified like this of the United
States, the great danger lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the legislative body.
The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be levelled against that quarter where the great-
est danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest prerogative of power. But this is not
found in either the executive or legislative departments of Government, but in the body of the
people, operating by the majority against the minority.
Id. at 454-55.
94. Id. at 457 (quoted supra note 90).
95.
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to
the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration;
and it might follow, by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were in-
tended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently inse-
cure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admis-
sion of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have
attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution.
Id. at 456. The last clause of the fourth resolution, id. at 452, was an early draft of the Ninth
Amendment.
96. Madison also argued that the states would enforce the Bill of Rights. Id. at 457. This expecta-




embraced only limited democracy. The founders viewed legislatures as a
serious threat to liberty, and at least one, Madison, saw further and real-
ized that the ultimate threat came from the majority of the people.
Nagel's account of original intent also distorts the larger political fight
over ratification. I know of no one who claims that the Constitution could
have been ratified without the promise of a Bill of Rights. Whatever the
delegates at Philadelphia might have thought, a large part of the Ameri-
can people demanded and got a Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights was an
essential part of the original bargain; the argument that it was unneces-
sary did not prevail.
Attention to the rights of individuals strikes at the heart of Nagel's po-
sition. If one is indifferent to the rights of individual victims, then one will
be puzzled by judicial enforcement of individual rights. But if one believes
that the Constitution guarantees individual rights-which seems clear
from the text-and if one believes that each individual is important, then
vigorous judicial enforcement of those rights will not be puzzling.97
Attention to individual rights also has more specific implications for
Nagel's argument. The number of individuals whose rights can be sup-
pressed without threatening the general system of free speech may be
quite large, especially if the victims are an identifiable category so that the
citizenry at large does not fear that suppression will spread to it. It may
even be that the political system responds best to the most severe out-
breaks of suppression, like McCarthyism. Once it began to appear that
few public figures and few government employees were safe, a powerful
constituency was mobilized to fight McCarthy. In sharp contrast, the po-
litical branches did not respond to defend the Jehovah's Witnesses, who
were systematically restricted, prosecuted, and harassed. Only a long se-
ries of Supreme Court decisions ended American persecution of Jehovah's
Witnesses."' Thus, Nagel's comfortable reliance on the political branches
may be a function of his disregard for the rights of individuals.
D. The Merits of Judicial Review and the Meaning of the Constitution
1. Nagel's Criteria for Evaluating Judicial Review
Much of Nagel's argument against active judicial review consists of ex-
amples of cases where judicial review worked badly or where the other
branches did better. Much of my response consists of examples where ju-
dicial review worked well or where the other branches did even worse.
97. For the argument that individualism is a unifying constitutional value, see Laycock, Taking
Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review (Book Review), 59 TEx. L. REV. 343, 371-76
(1981).
98. For a summary of these cases, see Laycock, A Suney of Religious Liberty in the United
States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 419-20 (1986). For an account of the private harassment of Witnesses,
See P. IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONvicrIONs 22-35 (1988).
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Nagel's examples alone are misleading; my examples alone would be
equally misleading. The reality includes both sets of examples. Nagel does
well to remind the more naive proponents of judicial review that judges
are not always the friends of liberty, and that the other two branches are
not always the enemy. What conclusions follow when both sets of exam-
ples are considered together?
The justification for active judicial review does not depend on any claim
that judges are always right, or even that on average they are right more
often than the political branches. The justification is that judicial review
gives claims of constitutional right one more chance to be heard. Constitu-
tional claims can be presented to the legislature and the executive like any
other legal or political claim. But in addition, constitutional claims can be
presented to the courts, and the courts are obliged to listen. The courts are
reasonably insulated from short-term political pressures, although hardly
insulated at all from long-term political changes.
The courts may or may not be any more sympathetic than the other
branches, but they ensure that constitutional claims will at least get a
hearing, and they give the constitutional claim one more chance to prevail.
And in this last chance, the sources of political rigidity in judicial review
also yield important advantages. For minorities and isolated individuals, it
is a decided advantage to have one branch that is obliged to hear their
claims, to render public judgment, to state principled reasons for decision,
and to treat like cases alike.99
This extra chance will not always be needed, and it will not always be
efficacious. Sometimes Congress will be the best protector of liberty, as
during Reconstruction, or in the Equal Access Act,'00 which protects stu-
dent free speech from judicial content discrimination, or in the statute al-
lowing military officers to wear yarmulkes.' '
Sometimes the executive will be a powerful protector of liberty, as in
the Civil Rights Division's litigation in the sixties, 02 or in Truman's de-
segregation of the military,'0 3 or-if you think he was right-in Jackson's
veto of the Second Bank.0 4 I would add the Emancipation Proclamation
99. Cf. Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359 (arguing that minorities are
disadvantaged by informal dispute resolution).
100. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988).
101. 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1988) (overruling result in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)).
102. See T. BRANCH, supra note 61, passin. A detailed index identifies descriptions of the Justice
Department's role under the following entries: "Doar, John," "Justice Department, U.S.," "Kennedy,
Robert F.," "Marshall, Burke," and "White, Byron."
103. See Butler, Race Relations in the Military, in THE MILITARY: MORE THAN JUST A JOB?
115, 119 (C. Moskos & F. Wood eds. 1988).
104. For a review of the Bank controversy, see P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 9-59 (2d ed. 1983). Jackson's veto message is excerpted in id. at 51-56;
the entire message appears in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576-91 (J. Richardson
ed. 1897). Jackson thought he was protecting the people from the dangers of concentrated wealth and
concentrated Federal power.
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and Lincoln's prosecution of the Civil War, even though Lincoln repeat-
edly violated the Constitution in pursuit of larger goals. Lincoln and the
Reconstruction Congresses accomplished a true revolution-a fundamen-
tal change in favor of liberty, achieved by force of arms because it could
not be achieved within the voting rules created by the original Constitu-
tion.105 Revolutions by definition violate positive law; they must be legiti-
mated by their moral rightness and by subsequent acceptance of their re-
sults. Like Washington's before him, Lincoln's revolution has been
legitimated.1"'
Sometimes the Court will be the best protector of liberty, as in the Je-
hovah's Witness cases, the desegregation cases, the school prayer cases, the
reapportionment cases, and the criminal procedure cases. Sometimes all
three branches will collaborate in a constitutional violation, as in the nine-
teenth century persecution of the Mormons,"'0 or the oppression of blacks
for three-quarters of a century after the end of Reconstruction.
Nagel's argument against judicial review relies heavily on the history of
judicial errors. In considering such an argument, it is essential to distin-
guish two kinds of errors. Judges may err by not enforcing liberties that
the Constitution guarantees, or they may err by enforcing supposed liber-
ties that the Constitution does not guarantee. Both types of error are inev-
itable, but only the second type supports an argument against judicial
review.
In the first type of error, where the judges fail to protect a constitu-
tional right, they have failed to perform their function. That is bad for the
constitutional system, and bad for liberty. But this kind of judicial error
does not make us worse off than we would have been without judicial
review. Judicial failures to protect liberty, judicial enforcement of oppres-
sion by the other branches, even doctrinal fluctuations between protecting
constitutional rights and not protecting them-none of these is an argu-
ment against active judicial review. As long as the judges enforce constitu-
tional rights some of the time, they are doing some good, and that good is
not offset by other instances in which the judges fail to do other good.
A serious argument against judicial review arises only from the second
105. For a demonstration that the Reconstruction Amendments cannot be legitimated by the vot-
ing rules in Article V of the Constitution, see Ackerman, supra note 32, at 500-07. Ackerman does
not characterize the amendments as revolutionary.
106. For the difficulties of deciding whether Lincoln was loyal to the pre-1865 Constitution, see
S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 139-42 (1988). For the argument that Lincoln was one of
the "principal architects of our constitutive tradition," see Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers:
Sketching an Ethos of Constitutional Liberty, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1305, 1323-24, 1328-33.
107. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
US. 1 (1890) (upholding confiscation of church property); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890)
(upholding religious test oath for voting); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (affirming
criminal conviction for polygamy). For a full history, see E. FIRMAGE & R. MANGRUM, ZION IN THE
COURTS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JEsus CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
1830-1900 (1988).
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type of error, where judges begin to enforce things that are not in the
Constitution at all. The Lochner-era liberty of contract cases are an ex-
ample, and the busing cases are an example from the other end of the
political spectrum.' 08 In these cases, the courts inflicted high social costs
on the basis of constitutional misinterpretations. In cases where that hap-
pens, we would be better off without judicial review. If we were debating
a constitutional amendment to eliminate judicial review, these costs of ju-
dicial review would be weighed against the benefits.
If it were perfectly clear what the Constitution guarantees, we would
not have judicial errors of either type. Indeed, we would not need an elab-
orate judicial procedure to apply the Constitution to individual cases. Be-
cause the Constitution is not perfectly clear, Americans will not be able to
agree on a single list of cases in which the courts did harm by enforcing
rights not to be found in the Constitution.
2. Nagel's Rules of Constitutional Interpretation
We come therefore to the heart of the problem: What does the Consti-
tution mean? Nagel thinks it self-evident that the individual liberty provi-
sions of the Constitution mean almost nothing. He finds most constitu-
tional interpretation "exceedingly implausible," "downright implausible,"
and "magical or superstitious."'109 He believes "that the Constitution ei-
ther does not bear at all, or bears only in complex and indeterminate
ways, on most specific public issues."' 10 He implies that it is unsophistica-
ted-naive or just foolish-to find the Court's interpretations plausible."'
He offers no argument to support these claims.
This is not the place to carefully explore the meaning of the Constitu-
tion. I will say here that I find Nagel's assertions not merely implausible,
but almost incomprehensible. I understand disagreement about constitu-
tional interpretation at the margins, even on important issues. But I do
not understand the claim that almost nothing is unconstitutional.
The Constitution states principles in sweeping terms. Each of these
principles seems on its face to apply to a broad range of cases. Whatever
else one says about the Supreme Court's free speech and press cases, they
are nearly always cases in which some unit of government has restricted
or penalized someone's speech, or someone's use of a printing press, or
someone's use of a modern analogue of the printing press. These cases fall
108. Any contemporary example of excess will inevitably be more controversial than an old exam-
ple. I believe that the busing cases are not constitutionally required, because they seek to achieve a
new status quo that would never have existed even if the Constitution had not been violated. For this
view of remedies as designed to restore victims to their rightful position, and the contrasting view that
equity courts have a general commission to do good in the wake of a violation of law, see D. LAY-
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naturally within the broad principles stated in the speech and press
clauses. Similarly, whatever else one says about the Supreme Court's
equal protection cases, they are nearly always cases in which some unit of
government has applied one law to one group of persons, and a different,
unequal law to another group of persons who are in some sense similarly
situated. These cases fall naturally within the broad principle stated in the
equal protection clause. And so on. To claim that nothing in the Constitu-
tion informs the great bulk of constitutional cases requires an invincible
hostility to the constitutional text. Even very conservative judges recognize
that the Constitution contains principles that potentially apply to modern
legislation." 2 Only Lino Graglia exceeds the extremism of Nagel's claim
that almost nothing is unconstitutional.'"
The claim that the Constitution says nothing about most constitutional
controversies necessarily entails one or both of the following claims:
1) The text of the Constitution does not count. Constitutional mean-
ing is to be found only in extra-constitutional sources, such as the
unratified writings, speeches, and thoughts of the founders.
2) Broad statements of principle do not count. The Constitution
would apply to specific disputes only if the founders had anticipated
each dispute.
Nagel does not say that the text does not count. But he does appear to
say that the text alone does not count. He would permit the judiciary to
invalidate the acts of other government institutions only when those acts
are "emphatically inconsistent with constitutional theory, text, and public
understanding as expressed in prolonged practice.'1114 In another formula-
tion of this point, he requires inconsistency with "the clear sense and his-
tory of the Constitution and . . . apparent public understandings.""' 5 So
the constitutional text does not count unless it is confirmed by public un-
derstanding, and either constitutional theory or history, or perhaps both.
His demand for "public understanding" makes the constitutional rights
112. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (Scalia joined majority opinion reversing
criminal conviction for flag desecration); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S.
Ct. 1384, 1398 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (voting to invalidate requirement that Treasury employ-
cc& submit to urinalysis); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (Eas-
tcrbrook, J.) (striking down pornography ordinance), affd mein., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Ollman v.
Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (protecting expressions of opinion
from liability for defamation), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
113. See, e.g., Graglia, Constitutional Mysticism: The Aspirational Defense of Judicial Review
(Book Review), 98 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1344 & n.26 (1985) ("If judicial review were in fact limited
to merely enforcing the restrictions of the Constitution, there would be so few occasions for its exercise
that it would be a subject of little controversy or even interest .... An example of a plainly unconsti-
tutional statute would be difficult to find in a standard constitutional law casebook, except for the
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of minorities and isolated individuals hostage to the constitutional under-
standing of a hypothetical majority. He would make judicial protection
available only when it is not needed. He wholly rejects the Madisonian
effort to protect the minority from the majority by constitutional law.""
His apparent treatment of history, theory, and public understanding as
equal in authority to the text ignores what was ratified. Representatives of
the American people once voted on the constitutional text. They did not
vote on anyone's theory, or on anyone's account of history, or on future
public understanding. 117 Of course we must read the text in historical
context, and we must try to identify the theory or theories that unify the
text. But only the text was ratified, and it is the ultimate source of consti-
tutional law.
At another point, Nagel suggests that broad statements of principle in
the Constitution do not count, because they are "so general and cryp-
tic."'" This too is part of the mindset that enables one to claim that the
Constitution forbids almost nothing. It assumes that the founders were
either naive or disingenuous-either fool enough to think that broad state-
ments of principle would matter, or knavish enough to include such state-
ments knowing they would not matter. I will leave it to original intent
theorists to work out the competing implications of a fool theory and a
knave theory.
If instead we take seriously the sweeping principles stated in the consti-
tutional text, they seem to both protect and forbid a great number of
things. But few of those things are specifically mentioned. The Constitu-
tion does not expressly mention seditious libel, political debate, religious
proselytizing, great literature, pulp novels, newspaper editorials, sports re-
porting, gossip columns, small talk, political cartoons, drive-in movie thea-
ters, or television. Instead, it refers generically to "freedom of speech or of
the press." It does not expressly mention the death penalty for speech, or
punitive damages, or presumed damages, or damages for emotional dis-
tress, or firing government employees, or suspending students from school,
or excluding preachers from parks, or knocking down protesters with fire
hoses and police dogs. Instead, it refers generically to "abridging" the
freedom of speech.
To insist that every application of the Constitution be stated in the con-
stitutional text-and presumably also in the legislative history and in the
public understanding-is to make constitutionalism impossible. Constitu-
tional protections of liberty are possible only if they are stated as broad
116. See supra note 93.
117. I address the choice between text and extrinsic evidence of original intent in D. Laycock,
Originalism, Text, and Intent (1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
118. P. 126.
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principles. 19 To say that such sweeping principles have no application is
to deny the possibility of constitutional meaning.
II. THE SPECIAL CASE OF FEDERALISM
Chapter 4 of Nagel's book is about federalism. It fits oddly with the
rest of the book, because its principal claim is that the Court has not been
active enough in protecting federalism. But there is no reason to think that
federalism decisions are exempt from Nagel's general critique of judicial
review. If judicial enforcement can only make a mess of individual liber-
ties, then surely it can only make a mess of federalism. What Nagel would
apparently like is an occasional symbolic reaffirmation of federalism, with
no follow up litigation demanding case-by-case enforcement. But as he
recognizes, that is an impossible dream."
Much of the chapter is devoted to an elaborate defense of National
League of Cities v. Usery 21 This is well worth reading, especially for
those scholars who claim to find the Court's opinion comprehensible only
as an implicit declaration of a constitutional right to welfare. 22 It is not
difficult to understand the state's interest in controlling the relationship
between itself and its employees, and Nagel elaborates the point with
more clarity and force than the Court did. He exposes the methodological
inconsistencies of scholars who insist on expansive interpretations of indi-
vidual rights provisions and crabbed readings of federalism provisions. 23
It is less clear to me that this state interest is constitutionally protected.
Nothing in the constitutional text immunizes states from Federal regula-
tion of interstate commerce. 24 Rather, the Constitution protects the states
by limiting the powers of the Federal Government. The question is
whether state and local government employment is a transaction in inter-
state commerce. State and local government employees are now 12.7% of
civilian employment, 25 down from 13.9% when National League of Cit-
ies was decided.' 21 Even if there can still be small pockets of isolated
119. I mean to assert only that the Constitution itself must be stated in terms of broad principles.
This is a corollary of its brevity, its permanence, and its functions. I do not speak to the distinct issue
of how broadly or narrowly courts should formulate legal doctrine explicating the Constitution. On
the latter issue, see Schauer, Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism (Book Review), 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 397 (1989).
120. P. 81.
121. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
122. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities:
The New Federalism and Affinnative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (1977).
123. P. 64.
124. See Laycock, supra note 97, at 366-67.
125. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table 479, at 293 (109th ed. 1989)
(13,913,000 state and local government workers); id., Table 626, at 380 (109,597,000 persons em-
ployed in civilian non-institutional population age 16 and over).
126. The Tables cited supra note 125 show 12,054,000 state and local government employees in
1975 out of 85,846,000 employed persons in the civilian non-institutional population age 16 and over.
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workers whose conditions do not affect interstate commerce, National
League of Cities was not such a case.
Nagel also seems to think that National League of Cities was consistent
with public understanding of the role of state and local governments. 27
On this point, I am quite sure he is wrong. To the extent that the public
knew about this controversy at all, the public was simply puzzled and
angry that some American workers were denied the protections accorded
to all other American workers. I am confident of that point from personal
experience on an analogous issue. I have argued that the free exercise
clause exempts churches from a wide range of labor regulation. 28 The
dominant response to that position-from committees of church represent-
atives, from my students, and from other scholars-is that church workers
are entitled to the same rights as other workers. I can sometimes persuade
people to see the churches' interest in controlling the workforce that per-
forms its religious mission, but the first reaction is always sympathy for
the workers. I doubt that public understanding would be any different
with respect to government workers.
Apart from overruling National League of Cities, one can hardly
charge the present Supreme Court with inattention to federalism. It has
created an elaborate set of substantive, jurisdictional, and procedural ob-
stacles to lawsuits challenging illegal behavior of state and local offi-
cials.129 Most of this law has been created in the name of federalism.
Nagel waves it aside on the ground that it is not expressly constitutional
law.' 30 He does not even mention the Court's expansive interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment, which is done in the name of the Constitution
and goes far beyond anything arguably found in the constitutional text. 3
Still, Nagel is right that the late twentieth century understanding of
federalism is very different from the late eighteenth century understanding
of federalism. He seems to blame this change on the judges.132 Whether
the judges caused it, or helped it, or merely acquiesced in it, it is common
for commentators to imply that somehow a usurpation has occurred-that
the shift to Federal power cannot be justified by any positivist theory of
constitutional interpretation.'3
127. Pp. 80-81.
128. Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
129. See generally 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE §§ 4221-37 (1988) (Federal injunctions against state proceedings and Federal actions to re-
strain state officers); 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE §§ 4241-4268.5 (abstention doctrines, "Our Federalism," and habeas corpus).
130. P. 62.
131. See Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342
(1989).
132. P. 11.
133. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 32, at 457-58, 510-15 (rejecting as "myth" claim that New
Deal policies were valid under Constitution as it existed prior to 1930's, and insisting that New Deal
required implicit constitutional amendment).
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The claim that the Constitution does not authorize the current balance
of state and Federal power has always seemed to me fundamentally
wrong, in part for familiar reasons and in part for reasons that are often
neglected. Before the Civil War, eleven of twelve constitutional amend-
ments limited Federal power. Since the Civil War, nine of fourteen
amendments expanded Federal power, 13 and some of the expansions have
been enormous.
The most familiar expansion of Federal power resulted from the Civil
War and the Reconstruction Amendments. Nagel manages to write a
chapter on federalism without mentioning either in his text! He does say
in a footnote that the Fourteenth Amendment does not justify "losing sight
of the framers' original scheme."1 5 Jefferson Davis could not have said it
better. But the Reconstruction Amendments, enacted to the end that
"these honored dead shall not have died in vain,"136 are not plausibly
viewed as narrow technical changes that left intact "the framers' original
scheme."
The second reason, familiar but less so, is the transportation and com-
munication revolutions that forever changed the nature of interstate com-
merce. One could apply the Supreme Court's modern law of interstate
commerce to the economy of 1787, and most commerce would be intra-
state. Land transportation was prohibitively expensive; the cost of ship-
ping goods thirty miles inland equaled the cost of shipping them to Eu-
rope.1 7 Consequently, the nation was divided into a large number of
small local markets. Most commerce was contained within one of these
markets, and prices in one market had little or no effect on prices in an-
other. With the coming of the railroads, the local market was linked to
national markets and lost control of its destiny. Local prosperity now de-
pended on far away and uncontrollable developments. The change was
sudden and dramatic; it required no legal fiction to see the effects. 8'
When railroads or paved highways ran everywhere, the change was uni-
versal. No state or locality could manage its own economy and no com-
merce was beyond the reach of the commerce clause.
Voters increasingly chose to regulate this integrated national economy
at the Federal level, especially after the Great Depression overwhelmed
134. I am counting amendments 13-19, 24, and 26. Some of these were single issue amendments
not part of any larger package-women's suffrage (Nineteenth Amendment), abolition of the poll tax
(Twenty-Fourth Amendment), the eighteen year old vote (Twenty-Sixth Amendment), and prohibi-
tion (Eighteenth Amendment).
135. Pp. 188-89 n.34.
136. A. LINCOLN, GETTYSBURG ADDRESS (1863).
137. See J. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 11 (1988).
138. For a general history, see G. TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION, 1815-1860
(1951). For an account of what happened when the railroad came to a pioneer community in central
Illinois, see J. FARAGHER, SUGAR CREEK: LIFE ON THE ILLINOIS PRAIRIE 178-80, 216-17, 221-22
(1986).
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the resources of state and local government.1"' This choice of Federal reg-
ulation was authorized by the original constitutional text, and contrary
Supreme Court decisions were properly viewed as obstructionist. The con-
cept of intrastate commerce became obsolete, not because of judicial inter-
pretation, but because of technological change.
The third reason for the growth of Federal power, almost wholly ne-
glected by constitutional lawyers who hated the basic tax course, is the
Sixteenth Amendment. The Sixteenth Amendment made available to the
Federal Government a vast source of revenue previously denied to it. It
authorized the federal government to take as large a share of the national
income as it could persuade the voters to allow. This share turned out to
be very large, especially after a little-known corporate financial officer
invented the withholding tax. 4°
The Sixteenth Amendment was duly ratified by three-quarters of the
states precisely because the people wanted a bigger Federal Government
- because without a new revenue base, the Federal Government could
not do what voters now expected it to do. The need for more revenue
presupposes a need for more spending, which in turn implies a
Hamiltonian understanding of the spending clause. 4 '
As much as any other issue, and more than most, the federal tax power
separated the founding Federalists and Anti-Federalists. One historian de-
scribes the Virginia Anti-Federalists as fearing Federal power, and espe-
cially the tax power, "almost to the point of paranoia."' 42 In part to ac-
commodate such fears, Federal powers of direct taxation were subjected to
apportionment conditions so burdensome that the powers were rarely ex-
ercised. 43 The Sixteenth Amendment changed all that. It has made possi-
139. On the exhaustion of state and local resources, see J. BURNS, THE WORKSHOP OF DENIOC-
RACY 556-57 (1985); R. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH To POWER 241-52
(1982); C. PHILLIPS, FROM THE CRASH TO THE BLrrz, 1929-1939, at 33-54 (1969); A. ROMASCO,
THE POVERTY OF ABUNDANCE: HOOVER, THE NATION, AND THE DEPRESSION 152-72 (1965); A.
SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 261-81 (1959).
140. See D. BRINKLEY, WASHINGTON GOES TO WAR 216-19 (1988). For a scholarly account,
see Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax
During World War II, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 685, 695-97 (1988).
141. Hamilton argued that the power to spend for the general welfare was not limited to the
scope of the other grants of power in Article I. See A. HAMILTON, Report on the Subject of Alanufac-
lures (1791), in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 302-04 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds.
1966); see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64-67 (1936) (adopting Hamilton's
interpretation).
142. T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 209 (1986). For predictions that the Federal tax power would oppress the
people, monopolize the sources of revenue, and thus destroy the state governments, see 3 J. ELLIOT,
DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 55-57 (reprint ed. 1987) (remarks of
Patrick Henry); 2 id. at 337-39 (remarks of John Williams and Melancton Smith).
143. See F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CON-
STITUTION 264 (1985) (due to variations in wealth between states, requirement that direct taxes be
apportioned by population "was so inequitable that, for practical purposes, it virtually denied Con-
gress the power to levy direct taxes altogether."). Congress levied apportioned taxes on real estate and
slaves once in 1798, for several years to finance the War of 1812, and once (on real estate only) at the
outbreak of the Civil War. The statutes are collected in Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586,
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ble all the vast growth of Federal Government in this century. The Amer-
ican Taxpayer's Association understood this best; it responded to the New
Deal by urging the repeal of the Sixteenth Amendment.""
The Sixteenth Amendment worked as profound a change in American
federalism as the Fourteenth. Yet it is not even mentioned in the leading
constitutional law casebooks, 45 and it gets only a passing mention in the
leading treatise. 4 Bruce Ackerman asks rhetorically, "What possible rel-
evance does the enactment of the Income Tax Amendment . . . have on
the continuing vitality of Plessy's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment?"'1 7 His implicit answer is "none whatever." That answer seems
reasonable until you learn that for Ackerman, what undermined Plessy
was "the New Deal's affirmation of activist government."', 8 The Six-
teenth Amendment had everything do with the rise of an activist federal
government, and the demand for activist Federal Government was part
and parcel of the demand for activist government at all levels.
Direct election of Senators caused a fourth accretion to Federal power.
When state legislatures elected United States Senators, and more to the
point, when state legislatures re-elected or refused to re-elect United
States Senators, one house of Congress was directly beholden to state leg-
islatures. It is hard to imagine that a senator so elected could defy his
legislature on a matter important to it. Direct election made it possible for
the people to appeal directly to their Federal representatives without in-
terference by their state legislatures, and for Federal representatives to
appeal directly to the people without worrying as much about what state
legislators might think. To the extent that expansion of Federal power
might be limited by the institutional jealousy of state governments, the
power of state governments was reduced.
It is hard to know the size of this effect, and I do not claim that it was
large. The Amendment was debated on grounds of direct versus indirect
democracy; legislative deadlocks and corruption in the choice of senators
had become a scandal. 4 9 The progressive demand for direct election was
related to the progressive demand for more responsive and activist govern-
ment, but federalism implications as such appear to have played no role.
598-99 (1880). Short-lived nineteenth-century income taxes were not apportioned. Compare Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (invalidating unapportioned tax on income from
property) with Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (upholding Civil War income tax as
indirect excise tax).
144. R. CAPLAN, supra note 31, at 68-69.
145. I examined P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, supra note 104; G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1 th ed. 1985); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (6th ed. 1986); and G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1986).
146. L. TRIBE, supra note 29, § 5.2 at 300, § 5.9 at 318-19.
147. Ackerman, supra note 32, at 530.
148. Id. at 530-36.
149. The historical facts in this paragraph are taken from R. CAPLAN, supra note 31, at 61-65.
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State legislatures, responding to popular pressure, called for a constitu-
tional convention to consider the Amendment, and many state legislatures
achieved de facto direct election through campaign pledges to support the
candidate who got the most votes in a legally non-binding popular elec-
tion. Resistance was concentrated in the United States Senate, where in-
cumbents were threatened by a change in their electoral base. But the
directly-elected successors of these senators had a different electoral base,
and they owed little to their state legislatures. Whatever the original moti-
vation, the Seventeenth Amendment is one more duly ratified shift of
power from the state to the Federal level.
Thus, Nagel is right when he says that our understanding of federalism
has shifted since 1787. He is wrong to give the judges much credit or
blame for that. He is certainly wrong to suggest that there is something
illegitimate about it. Technological revolution, Civil War, and constitu-
tional amendments shifted vast powers from the states to the Federal Gov-
ernment. The American people fought and died and repeatedly voted to
change the founders' understanding of federalism.
III. THE CRITIQUE OF SUPREME COURT OPINION WRITING
A. The Formulaic Constitution
Chapters 5-7 criticize the analytic techniques of Supreme Court opin-
ions. Chapter 5 examines the rational basis test in equal protection doc-
trine, and chapter 6 examines standards of constitutional justification
more generally. Chapter 7 generalizes further, examining the costs of the
Court's compulsion to explain all of constitutional law in terms of multi-
part formulas.
Nagel's critique of form is powerful. Common to each of these chapters
is a showing that the opinions often conceal or subordinate what is really
at stake in a case. 150 Thus, a statute may be condemned because it does
not fit some rationale invented by lawyers for the state, even though it is
perfectly rational for some other reason, not considered by the Court and
sometimes not even argued by the state.15' A special case of this is a ra-
tional statutory compromise between conflicting purposes, condemned as
irrational because it does not fit any of the purposes considered one at a
time.1
52
There is a similar propensity to focus on collateral issues at more de-
manding levels of review. The Court scrutinizes details of the fit between
legislative means and legislative ends, often including wholly hypothetical
ends, but it devotes much less attention to the importance and constitu-






legislatures almost never have a bad idea, but that they have a terrible
propensity to be overinclusive and underinclusive.
Of course the Court is not as stupid as Nagel's description of these
opinions implies. When the Court ignores the real reason for a statute, it
must be because the Court has decided that the real reason is of dubious
constitutional weight or legitimacy. One of Nagel's better examples is Ei-
senstadt v. Baird,153 which invalidated a ban on the sale of most contra-
ceptives to unmarried persons. That case is comprehensible only as a
holding about the state's interest in deterring premarital sex. The Court
had to find that interest either constitutionally illegitimate, or insufficient
to justify imposing the risk of unwanted parenthood. Another of Nagel's
examples is Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,15 1 which struck down a
statute forbidding visible nudity in outdoor theaters. That decision is com-
prehensible only as a holding that the offense to neighbors and passersby
is insufficient reason to justify burdensome regulation that might make
some movies less available to customers desiring to see them.
Yet my account of these cases bears little resemblance to either opinion.
In Eisenstadt, the Court's opinion declared that less-than-absolute restric-
tions on the sale of contraceptives were not rationally related to any of the
state's supposed goals. Nagel's analysis of this explanation is
devastating.' 55
In Erznoznik, the Court said that nudity had been improperly singled
out from other offensive speech on the basis of content,' 56 and that ban-
ning visible nudity was overinclusive as a means of protecting minors 57
and underinclusive as a means of preventing traffic accidents.' 5 The
Court did note that citizens in a pluralistic society must put up with of-
fensive speech, that persons offended by movies could avert their eyes, and
that the ordinance would deter the showing of movies with nudity.'59 But
these fundamental points were not presented as fundamental; they were
presented as explication of the supposed main point about content
discrimination.
Content discrimination cannot really be the main point in Erznoznik; if
it is, the opinion collapses in contradiction. The Court assumed that the
state could restrict all offensive speech on the basis of its content, for of-
fensiveness is a content-based category. Having assumed that, the Court
forbade further content discrimination within the category. Thus, the
holding that the state could not discriminate against nudity is inconsistent
with the assumption that the state could discriminate against offensive
153. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
134. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
155. Pp. 88-90.
156. 422 U.S. at 211.
157. Id. at 212-14.
158. Id. at 214-15.
159. Id. at 209-12.
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speech. Moreover, the Court is surely not committed to either of these
positions. The Court would never uphold a general ban on offensive
speech. 60 But it would uphold content discrimination against nudity in
some contexts, including contexts with greater First Amendment signifi-
cance. Consider the Court's likely reaction to nude guerilla theater on the
Mall."'
Nagel's demolition of these opinions merely highlights the real ques-
tion. If the Court emphasizes reasons that are hard to take seriously, we
must ask why the Court will not emphasize its real reasons.
Nagel is most effective in chapter 7, where he condemns "the formulaic
Constitution." The modern Supreme Court tends to convert every consti-
tutional right into a formula, usually a three- or four-part test. Most of
the Court's effort is devoted to the essentially legislative task of devising
these formulas, each to govern a large category of cases. Much less effort
is devoted to deciding individual cases. The first step in any case not
clearly subject to an existing formula is to choose the standard of review.
The choice of a standard of review is generally divorced from the facts of
the case, and often consumes the bulk of the opinion;"6 2 applying the re-
sulting standard to the facts is a tag end or a problem to be dealt with on
remand.
This approach to opinion writing has many pernicious consequences. It
substitutes dull and lifeless prose for the powerful language of the Consti-
tution.' It substitutes a regulatory perspective for a judicial one, a focus
on a whole set of cases for a focus on this case.164 It produces abstract
opinions-opinions that are abstracted both from the facts of the case and
from the moral values at stake.'6 5 It makes the issues before the Court
seem technical, beyond the understanding of ordinary citizens.' 6 It com-
partmentalizes cases into a series of tests, or hurdles, to be considered one
at a time. "The compartmentalization so characteristic of the formulaic
style impoverishes the Court's moral discourse . "..."167
I would add some additional characteristics of the formulaic style, im-
160. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 484 U.S. 46 (1988) (satirical description of
incest in outhouse); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("Some
uses of even the most offensive words are unquestionably protected."); Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415
U.S. 697 (1974) ("chicken shit"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) ("Fuck the Draft");
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (anti-Catholic hate literature).
161. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 211 n.7 ("'No one would suggest that the First Amendment
permits nudity in public places,'" (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting))); id. at 223 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (nude actors in park or street could be
prosecuted). For further analysis, see Levinson, Freedom of Expression in Contemporary American









plicit in Nagel's account but not emphasized. If the opinions are taken
seriously, the effect of the formulas is to forfeit the advantages of the case
method. The case method's strength is that rules are built up inductively
from the facts of individual cases. But these opinions develop the rule in
the abstract, without being informed by the facts of the case, and then
apply the rule to the facts. I do not believe the Justices really think in that
order; I am sure their reaction to the facts still plays a major role. But
that means only that the opinion is still further removed from their real
reasoning.
Part of the appeal of the formulas is that they imitate careful and de-
tailed legal analysis. To analyze a constitutional requirement-in the for-
mal sense of "analyze," meaning to break the requirement down into its
non-overlapping component parts-is a useful step. Law teachers con-
stantly struggle to get their students to do this. Such analysis can focus
attention on issues that might be confused or overlooked, and clarify what
various arguments and items of evidence are intended to prove. Even
when a formula merely identifies the important separable elements in a
balancing test, it can usefully structure the inquiry.
But few of the Supreme Court's formulas do either of these things. The
formulas are often constructed from snippets of old opinions, with each
snippet erected into an independent test. Nagel illustrates this process
when he traces snippets from National League of Cities18 into the short-
lived four-part test for Federal regulation of state and local employees.16 9
I have illustrated the process elsewhere by tracing the origins of the
Court's establishment clause formula.'7 Such snippets did not originate as
a coordinated test and are unlikely to be either cumulatively complete or
mutually exclusive. They were not designed as a formula, and their char-
acter is wholly changed when they are converted into one. In the estab-
lishment clause example, creation of the formula changed the substantive
meaning of the snippets. Phrases that originated as explanations of neu-
trality were converted into separate elements of a test that seemed to for-
bid any significant benefit to religion, even where the effect of withholding
a benefit was to inflict disproportionate harms.' 7 '
Creating formulas out of snippets of old opinions has the advantage
that there is a pre-formula period when the Court visibly grapples with
the facts of cases. The formula is derived from the snippets that emerge
from that grappling. But increasingly, the Court bypasses this process and
artificially constructs a multi-part test out of its head, as in Nagel's exam-
ples of opinions devoted to choosing the standard of review. Neither
168. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
169. Pp. 135-36.
170. Laycock, supra note 128, at 1380-81.
171. Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DE
PAUL L. REv. (forthcoming 1990).
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method has resulted in formulas that can plausibly claim to capture the
essence of the constitutional clause allegedly being interpreted. That is the
ultimate problem with the formulas. They lack "persuasiveness as an in-
terpretation of constitutional text.
M7 2
Again there are counter-examples-opinions that address the issue and
the competing interests more openly.'7 3 It is even possible to describe the
dominant pattern differently; Alex Aleinikoff describes modern Supreme
Court opinions as establishing an age of balancing. 74 Nagel and
Aleinikoff legitimately cite many of the same opinions, because a frequent
element of the Court's multi-part test is some threshold requirement for
the weight or substantiality of the government's interest. Aleinikoff em-
phasizes the requirement of a substantial interest and sees balancing;
Nagel looks at all three or four requirements and sees a formula. They
are both right.
But Nagel has captured something important about why Supreme
Court opinions are so often unsatisfying. The effect of breaking balancing
tests into separate assessments of the weight of the state's interest, the fit
between ends and means, the burden on the constitutional right, the possi-
bility of less restrictive means, and so on, is to subordinate and obfuscate
the striking of the balance. The Court prefers to rest its decision on one of
the other elements of the formula; it rarely strikes down a law on the
stated ground that the government's interest is not sufficient.
There are several reasons why Supreme Court opinion writing has
taken its modern turn. The legislative tone of the opinions is partly an
inevitable response to the difficulty of supervising all of Federal law, ad-
ministered by thousands of state and Federal judges, through a mere one
hundred fifty opinions each year.'75 The Court may have decided that
working out the law slowly through the case method is a luxury it can no
longer afford.
Another reason is that the Justices work under difficult conditions.
Opinions with odd explanations and opinions avoiding the real issue must
partly reflect the difficulties of group decision-making 77 and the intense
time pressures at the end of each Term. The Justices may be confident of
a result, and able to agree on a result, without being able to think through
or agree on every step of the explanation.
Another cause is that most constitutional law casebooks are forced by
coverage pressure to print only a small part of most opinions. The Court's
formulas always survive the editing process. Supreme Court clerks mas-
172. P. 143.
173. Pp. 98-102.
174. Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 963-72 (1987).
175. See Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 1175, 1178-79 (1989);
Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited
Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 1093 (1987).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
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tered those formulas and were rewarded with high grades; the formulas
may be the only way they know of doing constitutional law. In chambers
where the clerks write the opinions, the formulaic Constitution may be
self-perpetuating.
Each of these reasons contributes to the problem of the formulaic Con-
stitution. But I am not convinced that they explain the persistence with
which the Court de-emphasizes what is really at stake in cases. What does
explain it is the widespread failure to recognize the analytic structure of
constitutional rights.
B. The Structure of Constitutional Rights
The persistent theme in Nagel's three chapters on the Court's opinions
is that the Court tends to avoid talking about the central issue in its cases.
It almost never says that a legislative goal is constitutionally illegitimate;
only occasionally does it say that a legislative goal is not important enough
to override an apparent constitutional right. It rarely says such things be-
cause to do so invites attack from a host of scholars who believe that the
Court is not supposed to decide questions of substantive value. 1"7 Nagel's
book is merely one manifestation of that belief.
If the Court cannot admit to deciding anything important, it can shield
itself by talking about whether means fit ends, whether the issue is one
that requires a compelling fit, or a tailored fit, or merely a rational fit,
and so on through all the dreary prose of the formulaic Constitution. But
however it writes the opinion, the Court cannot avoid deciding whether
the legislative goal is constitutionally legitimate and important. Those are
the questions ultimately committed to judicial review. There is no reason
to second-guess legislators on whether legislative means achieve legislative
ends. But there is every reason to second-guess legislators on whether they
have interfered with constitutional ends. As another reviewer noted, the
rational and effective pursuit of evil is still evil, so that rationality and
means-ends scrutiny offer "specious protection" of constitutional rights.17 8
Nagel's account is not that different from mine, except that he thinks
the disabling attacks on the Court are legitimate. He sees the formulaic
Constitution as an attempt to conceal judicial discretion,'17 9 and to fit the
opinions somewhere between formalism and realism, both of which he
considers discredited. 8 ' He thinks that "mechanical" appeals to the con-
stitutional text "have long been discredited as aridly conceptualistic and
177. Seminal formulations of this view include: Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend-
ment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Tern-Foreword: In
Seaich of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1959).
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hopelessly literalistic," while "bald 'balancing' tests . . . too obviously
separate the Court from its sources of legitimacy."1 ' He appears to as-
sume that all appeals to text are mechanical, and that all balancing tests
are bald. But the claim that balancing tests separate the Court from its
sources of legitimacy is an unexplained ipse dixit.
A hint at the explanation appears in another passage, on the structure
of constitutional rights. Nagel is perplexed that a wide array of constitu-
tional doctrines fit into the same analytic pattern: "[T]he government
must justify its rules by articulating a sufficiently important purpose and
by demonstrating that the rule in some degree will actually achieve that
purpose."1 2 He finds it implausible that all the different clauses of the
Constitution "could be anchored in some single generic value." ' 3 Thus,
the Court's recurring approach to constitutional interpretation cannot be
so broadly applicable, and must not be derived from the Constitution.
Of course it is implausible that all constitutional rights serve the same
generic value. But it is not implausible that all or most constitutional
rights present an analytically similar question of justification. Each guar-
antee of a constitutional right forbids government to do something. Usu-
ally the prohibition is stated in sweeping terms, and often in absolute
terms. The Court might have enforced these prohibitions literally, disa-
bling government from ever abridging speech or impairing a contract, no
matter how great the need. But that would have been unworkable, dis-
crediting judicial review and forcing defiance or constitutional amend-
ment. Instead, the Court has implied exceptions.
It is only with respect to these implied exceptions that the common ana-
lytic pattern emerges. The first step in constitutional adjudication is to
decide whether the challenged government action falls within the scope of
one of the Constitution's prohibitions. The pattern that so puzzles Nagel
does not apply to this step of constitutional analysis. The Court asks very
different questions in deciding whether a challenged statute abridges
speech, or prohibits free exercise, or impairs the obligation of a contract,
or discriminates between two persons similarly situated. These questions
do reflect the variety of values that underlie different constitutional rights.
But once one of these questions is answered in the affirmative-once
the Court finds an apparent violation of one of the Constitution's sweep-
ing prohibitions-then we get to the recurring pattern of analysis that so
puzzles Nagel. Then the question is: Is there a governmental need so im-
portant that it justifies an implied exception to an expressly absolute con-
stitutional right? That is the question in speech cases, in religion cases, in
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dard is modified because the prohibition is not absolute. Judicial process
need be only that which is "due;" searches must be not "unreasonable";
takings must be with compensation that is "just." In these clauses, the
standard of justification is reduced, but the form of the question is the
same-is there justification for the government's action sufficient under
the standard stated in the relevant clause? Sometimes the constitutional
prohibition is implied from more general provisions, as in the family and
sexual autonomy cases. But once such a prohibition has been implied, and
a case falls within its scope, the question of justification takes the same
form.
Thus, sweeping prohibitions subject to implied exceptions for reasons of
necessity form the structure of constitutional rights. One of the Court's
essential tasks is to decide governmental claims that it is necessary to make
an exception to some apparent constitutional right. It is not at all surpris-
ing that the Court approaches all these claims by asking whether the ben-
efits to the government justify the exception.
What is surprising is that the standards vary as much as they do. Else-
where Nagel wonders why some implied exceptions require compelling
reasons, some substantial reasons, and some merely rational reasons.' 4
He is right to wonder about these varying standards of justification; they
are textually inexplicable. When the standard for justifying implied ex-
ceptions to textually absolute rights varies from toothless rational basis to
strict-in-theory but fatal-in-fact, the Court is simply picking and choosing
the constitutional rights it wants to enforce.
The proper standard for implied exceptions to absolute rights should be
something like the compelling interest test. An implied exception to a tex-
tually absolute right should be an extraordinary thing. We have learned
from experience that "no law" cannot literally mean no law. But "no
law" should mean hardly any law-as few laws as possible. Courts
should adhere as closely as possible to the text they are enforcing.
Whatever the standard of justification, the structure of constitutional
provisions leads directly to a certain kind of balancing. Obviously I do not
mean balancing in which the commands of the Constitution are reduced to
good advice, in which the Constitution is just one interest among many.
This is the sort of balancing that Alex Aleinikoff so effectively con-
demns. 85 Rather, I mean that the justification for implied exceptions to
constitutional rights inevitably depends on the urgency of the need for the
exception and on the importance of the exception to the constitutional
right. Courts should ask whether the cost of enforcing the apparent consti-
tutional right in each case is so grossly disproportionate to the constitu-
184. P. 153.
185. Aleinikoff, supra note 174, at 986-92.
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tional benefit that it would be essentially intolerable to enforce the text
absolutely.
Aleinikoff argues that such implied exceptions to constitutional rights
do not require balancing at all."8' But in this I think he errs. Courts will
inevitably create exceptions in such compelling cases, and the exceptions
will be narrowest if they are explained in precisely the terms that moti-
vate the Court. If we require the Court to invent "principled" reasons
broad enough to include all the exceptions it feels compelled to make, the
result will be ill-fitting proxies that sweep in less compelling exceptions as
well. Aleinikoff's insistence that the Court avoid balancing even in such
extreme cases mirrors Nagel's attack on balancing from the other side of
the political and jurisprudential spectra, and it produces similar pressures
to avoid discussing the real reasons for decision.
Far from separating the Court from its sources of legitimacy, balancing
is inevitable. Balancing is the restrained judicial response to the sweeping
and often absolute constitutional text. Explicit balancing tends to force the
Court to deal with the facts of each case before it,18 7 and thus tends to
reinforce the virtues of the case method, although the Court can balance
in broad categories when it chooses.
Honest balancing would not eliminate multi-part tests, although I think
it would make them fewer and simpler, and it would certainly make them
more candid. There would be much less talk of fit between means and
ends, and much more talk about the value choices that drive decisions.
Honest balancing would force the Court to talk about the value of the
constitutional right and the way in which and the extent to which the
challenged government action impairs the right. Government goals that
depended on a rejection of the constitutional right would be illegitimate,
and the Court would sometimes have to say so. More often, government
goals would be legitimate, but not important enough to justify overriding
an express constitutional right, and the Court would have to say that.
Sometimes, the goal would be legitimate and important, but the chal-
lenged statute would not benefit the goal enough to justify overriding the
constitutional right. Only this last set of cases bears any resemblance to
means-ends scrutiny. And even here the resemblance is superficial. The
ultimate issue in such cases is whether the statute does enough good to
justify implying an exception to the express constitutional right. The fact
of an express constitutional right should weigh very heavily in the bal-
ance; it should take a powerful showing of necessity to imply an
exception.
When the Court condemns a statute as irrational, or ill-suited to its
ends, it denigrates the statute and avoids the need to consider competing
186. Id. at 999-1000.
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interests. If instead the Court conceded that even unconstitutional statutes
usually serve plausible ends in a plausible manner, holdings of unconstitu-
tionality would require renewed explanation of the importance of the
right at issue and why it is that only the most compelling interests can
override it.
The Court rarely writes its opinions this way. Too many critics have
said the Court is not supposed to decide which goals are legitimate and
which are important. Certainly the political branches have a much more
general mandate to decide what is important. But in the context of consti-
tutional rights, legitimacy and importance are at the core of what courts
must decide, and we would all be better off if they did it explicitly.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nagel powerfully describes the results of the Supreme Court's efforts to
hide the ball, and he sometimes even sees that hiding the ball is part of
the problem. But his solution would be to abandon the ball game. He does
not see that the ball should be out in the open. He cannot see the legiti-
macy of balancing, because he does not see the structure of constitutional
rights. He does not see how constitutional law repeatedly requires the
Court to demand justification for the need to invade sweeping constitu-
tional prohibitions. He does not see the structure because he does not see
the sweeping prohibitions in the first place. He does not see sweeping
prohibitions because he refuses to take them seriously-because he consid-
ers sweeping prohibitions too "general and cryptic"' 88 to be credited.
Nagel cannot understand vigorous judicial review because he sees so
little meaning in the constitutional text, and he places so little value on the
rights of individuals. Not surprisingly, it is hard to explain an institution
without considering its principal source of authority and its principal rea-
son for existence.
188. P. 126.
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